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Abstract
This paper examines how the interplay between economic incentives and so-
cial preferences transmitted by ideology plays a role in the rise and fall of com-
munism. We introduce inequality-averse and ine¢ ciency-averse agents and model
their conict in ideology, triggered by envy. The socioeconomic dynamics generate
a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing
private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment
of communism is thus characterized to lead to the discovery of a trade-o¤ between
equality and e¢ ciency. The model also derives conditions under which the two
systems converge and become stable.
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February 1848: The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims.
They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible
overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble
at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but
their chains. They have a world to win.Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Manifesto of the Communist Party.1
September 2010: There were many odd things about my recent Havana
stopover [...] but one of the most unusual was Fidel Castros level of self-
reection. [...] I asked him if he believed the Cuban model was still something
worth exporting. The Cuban model doesnt even work for us anymore,he
said. Je¤rey Goldberg, Fidel: Cuban Model Doesnt Even Work for Us
Anymore,The Atlantic.2
1 Introduction
Communism was the grand experiment of the 20th century. It also seems to have been
its grand illusion. In terms of utopian vision, radical implementation and socioeconomic
impact, communism has left a lasting mark in history. Its rise and fall as a possible al-
ternative to capitalism is a complex and multi-faceted theme, interpreted from di¤erent
theoretical and methodological perspectives in social sciences. Works from many disci-
plines, going beyond politics and economics, have tried to portray or, more ambitiously,
explain the various manifestations of communism across the world from nascent and
militant through mature and oppressive into stagnating and decaying.
So why another attempt to reconsider the key driving mechanisms behind the genesis
of the revolutionary communist project and the gradual mass disillusionment with its
realities? This paper aims at studying how the economic system a¤ects the evolution
of beliefs and preferences through the endogenous socialization e¤orts of the various
social classes. Can this lead to cycles in economic systems, if a system gradually builds
opposition to itself? To analyze these questions, we rely on economic theory to examine
the interactive dynamics of economic incentives and social preferences through cultural
transmission.
In what follows, we model cultural transmission as a consequence of envy with respect
to inferior relative economic status, which can eventually translate into attempts to
overthrow the economic system in place. The idea is based on two among the most
popular theories of revolution, namely the Marxian theory (Marx, 1859 [1970]) and the
relative deprivation theory (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970); the proponents of these theories
believe that discontent leads automatically to change-oriented political action (Kuran,
1989). In other words, cultural transmission works as an intermediate mechanism linking
envy to attempts for a change to a new order. The importance of social comparison and
relative deprivation for organization life is also reviewed and emphasized by Olson et al.
(1986) and spelled out by Taubman and Taubman (1989). The latter authors observe
that to many Soviet people socialism seems to amount to social envy, the insistence
that my neighbor not live better than I do, even if the prospects of doing so prompts
him to produce more for us both(Mui, 1995).
To this end, we build a tractable model to formalize the role of socioeconomic fac-
tors in the process that led to the advent of communism via a forced revolution and
nationalization of capital, as well as its reversal back to markets. In essence, this grand
1Chapter IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Oppo-
sition Parties, translated by Samuel Moore in cooperation with Frederick Engels, 1888,
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch04.htm
2http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/09/del-cuban-model-doesnt-even-work-
for-us-anymore/62602/
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experiment resulted in gradual accumulation of experience and evidence across a few
generations that revealed a trade-o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency in terms of produc-
tivity and saving at the scale of alternative economic systems.3 Our theoretical account
of the rise and fall of communism, from the revolutionary enthusiasm of Marx and En-
gels through the disillusionment of Castro quoted above, is framed as a stylized game of
envy triggered by inferior relative status between two types of agents involving economic
decisions and transmission of ideology across generations. As we shall discuss in more
detail in section 6, this is along the lines of North (2005), who interprets the experience
with communism in Russia as a story of perceived reality ! beliefs ! institutions !
policies ! altered perceived reality and on and on (p. 4).4 The model also shows
conditions under which communism remains stable that can explain the persistence and
the success of the Chinese social market economy.
While the chain of logic by North (2005) is framed along purely descriptive argu-
mentation in the tradition of the new institutional economics, it is certainly compatible
with a learning perspective formalized in works such as Piketty (1995) and Buera et
al. (2011), possibly combined with indoctrination (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007).
Interestingly, recent empirical studies also provide direct evidence on the intergenera-
tional transmission of beliefs and cultural resilience. These include Patacchini and Zenou
(2016) on religion, and Dohmen et al. (2012) and Klasing (2014) on attitudes towards
risk and trust and how they interact with changes in institutions.
We therefore emphasize the role of socialization and the transmission of preferences
and beliefs, following a strand of literature stemming from Bisin and Verdier (2001)
that explores the role of intergenerational transmission of attitudes to explain the per-
sistence of socioeconomic status across generations.5 Our goal is to show how this same
mechanism can lead to a pendulum-like swing between economic systems. Only few
theoretical works focus on the interrelation between the intergenerational transmission
of preferences and institutional change. The closest to our work is Döpke and Zilibotti
(2008), which studies the role of the intergenerational transmission of taste for leisure
and patience in the success of institutional changes brought about by the industrial rev-
olution. Also, Saint-Paul (2010) analyzes the impact of the evolution of beliefs about the
workings of the market economy on ideological bias in the society and political reform.
More recently, Ticchi et al. (2013) develop a theory of endogenous regime transitions,
but emphasize democratic consolidations and citizenscommitment to defend democracy
against a potential military coup.
The incentive structure under the two economic systems is captured in our model by
the (mis)alignment of ownership and control. This is in line with the large literature on
the key weaknesses of socialism: one strand dealing with the pervasive problems arising
from the soft budget constraints of socialist enterprises (e.g., Kornai, 1980) what
Roemer (2008) labels lack of incentives; another pointing to the overambitious task
of central planning, given dispersed and local information, to ensure better allocative
decisions than markets (e.g., von Hayek, 1940, 1945) what Roemer (2008) labels lack of
coordination. Our approach highlights these two familiar disadvantages of a communist
economy at their crucial link, the intertemporal optimization decision, at which the
(mis)alignment of ownership and control manifests itself. The choice of consumption
and accumulation out of ones own wealth given the signals of competitive markets and
3For instance, Stretton (1976) writes: Equalities can always be ill-designed, or enforced by oppressive
methods. When they are, they may reduce productivity, as well as freedom. Some communist countries
have attened their margin for skill or hard work too far, with apparently bad e¤ect on economy
e¢ ciency.
4This view somewhat departs from earlier seminal works on communism versus capitalism, and related
studies on the comparative e¢ ciency of the two systems. Among many others, see Lange (1936 [1956]),
von Hayek (1940, 1945), Tinbergen (1960), Lancaster (1973), Kornai (1980), Roemer (1980, 1985).
5See Bisin and Verdier (2010) for a survey of the literature on cultural transmission and socialization
that followed.
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locally relevant information under capitalism sustains e¢ ciency but generates inequality.
Delegating this choice to an egalitarian planner forces equality by revolution but erodes
economic e¢ ciency, thus making everyone equal in their poverty.6
In this paper, we combine the above lines of thought and use the transmission and
evolution of envy-triggered preferences to shed light on the dynamics of regime switches
across economic systems. We devise a non-cooperative game between agent types that
takes place in every period of an overlapping-generations (OLG) framework to demon-
strate how the equilibrium strategies drive the long-run socioeconomic dynamics and
can generate such pendulum-like switch from markets to an egalitarian economy abol-
ishing private ownership, and back to rebuilding market incentives to sustain society.
We focus on a large region of the world where capitalism was less developed and, perhaps
more importantly, any democratization of the society was avoided or much delayed. Our
model also accommodates the alternative scenario explored in Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000a), where democratic reforms such as the extension of the franchise and the in-
crease of redistribution have enabled other regions to avoid the revolutionary advent of
communism.
In particular, we model two types of agents, one developing aversion towards in-
equality and the other towards ine¢ ciency both as a result of envy and deprivation.
Consequently, agents respond to economic incentives and transmit their values as they
are a¤ected by evolving economic outcomes. We rst show how capital accumulation by
the minority elite and the resulting inequality leads to increasing social discontent over
time and, eventually, the overthrow of the system. We then show how a centrally-planned
system aimed at equality also fades away due to misalignment of individual incentives
and aggregate targets, lower well-being and productivity, and the gradual redirection of
ideas towards a market system. The economic literature, and the literature on commu-
nism or social evolution more generally, has not provided so far a consistent theory on
the institutional change experienced by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries in
Eastern Europe throughout the 20th century accounting for both these transitions. In
this consists the contribution of our stylized but history-based formal analysis of the rise
and fall of communism and the conditions under which a central planning and a market
system converge and stabilize.
We support our theoretical results and the underlying assumptions by providing
a number of related historical (anecdotal and empirical) evidence in the relevant world
regions in section 5, focusing on the bifurcation of the transition path observed in Russia
and China. We also present and discuss evidence on the incentive problem faced in
centrally planned economies compared to those in which agents were free to choose
output targets as well as means to meet them. In fact, the key mechanism behind the
Soviet state-run system feeding ine¢ ciency into the economy is modeled based on the
ndings of Cheremukhin et al. (2017) on the Soviet experience of 1928-40, in which
the collectivization policies resulted in poor productivity performance in all sectors.
Bergson (1991), among others, also provides gures on the remarkably lower output
and consumption per worker in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
compared to the rest of the world. Finally, the ideology transmission dynamics of
our model also match some of the empirical ndings of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln
(2007), who explore the possibility of a feedback e¤ect from communism on preferences
by assessing the dynamics of support for state intervention among individuals in East
Germany compared to those in West Germany. Looking at the preferences of di¤erent
6Note that we ignore neither that inequalities were de facto existing in communist countries, nor that
they were creating resentment (see, e.g., Joo, 2005). However, considering explicitly the nomenklatura
and/or unethical behavior (by the regimes own standards) as internal mechanisms of the type analyzed
in Shleifer and Vishny (2002) would only complicate the model without changing the substance of
the results (in e¤ect, only accelerating the swing back from plan to market). For a venality-based
rent-seeking analysis of the behavior of communist leaders, see, e.g., Anderson and Boettke (1997).
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age groups after the reunication, they nd state support to be higher in some areas
for the age group whose older generation lived most of their lives before the start of
communism. Support then decisively fell from one generation to the next for subsequent
age groups who lived under communism.7
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we construct our model,
presenting the alternative economic systems, the types of agents, their objectives, con-
straints, conict, and the transmission of their beliefs across generations. Section 3 then
solves the optimization problems of the agent types in the von Stackelberg (1934 [2011],
1948 [1952]) game they play every period. Section 4 derives the intergenerational dy-
namics and highlights the resulting economic outcomes in terms of regime transitions
or stability. Section 5 situates our theory in historical context, justifying the key as-
sumptions we employ. The last section concludes by summarizing the insights from our
model and draws parallels between our ndings and the related literature. An Appendix,
nally, collects our formal derivations and proofs.
2 The Model
2.1 Systems and Agents
We consider two economic systems under which society can evolve: one (capitalist)
is based on the market, denoted by M , and the other (communist) on an egalitarian
planner, denoted by E. True to the historical genesis of communist ideas, our analysis
begins with a market-based system founded upon property rights over the means of pro-
duction and the corresponding private incentives to capital accumulation. Our interest
is in a particular region that at some point in time splits apart and experiments with
communism. Alternatively, one can start with an egalitarian system in the spirit of Dow
and Reed (2013), where enclosure leads to the creation of property rights for the elite,
increasing inequality between insiders and outsiders. It will be made clear that in our
context starting from a communist regime would deliver similar dynamics, keeping the
logic of our argument unchanged.
There are two types of agents in the initial capitalist society. Its total adult popu-
lation is normalized to 1. The large majority are born without inheriting capital: they
are the workers. They are unprivilegedin the sense that they can only sell their labor
force in the market in order to subsist, as Marx (18671894 [1967]) argued. Being the
have-nots, they care about inequality in the capitalist society, whose victim they are
by birth. We call them inequality-averse agents and denote their type as A. A minor-
ity of agents are born with inherited capital: they are the capitalists. They extract
rents from their private capital, and care about the relative ine¢ ciency between the two
systems. We call them ine¢ ciency-averse agents and denote their type as B.8
We consider an OLG model, where agents live for two periods. During childhood
(in the rst period of life), they are socializedacquiring a particular type when they
become adult. When mature (in the second period of life), they perform active economic
and ideological roles in the society, and die at the end of the period, investing any capital
wealth they have accumulated.
Under both systems, M and E, economic power belongs to the preference type who
decides upon and enforces the intertemporal allocation between capital accumulation
and consumption. The other preference type can then only try to change the economic
system through ideological inuence. We denote the relative political power of each
type by qt () and 1   qt (), respectively for types A and B in any period t, where
0 < qt () < 1. In the related literature, this index has been dened alternatively as
7See Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007): Figure 1, p. 1516.
8See also Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2000) and Olcina and Peñarrubia (2004) for alternative explana-
tions of the agent types.
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either the frequency of each preference type in the total adult population (Bisin and
Verdier, 2001), or the relative intensity of social resentment (Döpke and Zilibotti, 2008).
It, furthermore, captures the probability of a regime shift, as introduced by Ticchi et al.
(2013) in the context of political culture (in terms of tastefor democracy) and conict.
2.2 Preferences
The lifetime utility of agent i for i = A;B under each system j = M;E takes the form
UA(cAj;t; s
A
j;t; t+1; 
A
t ) = c
A
j;t + ln rj;t+1s
A
j;t   (1  qt+1) ln t+1  
 
At
2
2
; (1)
UB(cBj;t; s
B
j;t; t+1; 
B
t ) = c
B
j;t + ln rj;t+1s
B
j;t   qt+1 lnt+1  
 
Bt
2
2
;
where cij;t is the individual consumption level and rj;t+1s
i
j;t denotes next period interest
earnings on savings that enter individual utility as a bequest left to the next generation.9
Agents also experience disutility in terms of relative economic status with respect to
other individuals or the other system, depending on their type. More precisely, t+1 > 1
measures income of type B relative to type A or inequality within the society (eliminated
under E, i.e., t+1 = 1), and t+1 > 1 the ine¢ ciency of the centrally planned economy
relative to free market (absent underM , since t+1 = 1), as perceived at t. Furthermore,
the utility function embeds the assumption that with probability q the communist system
(E) will be in place in the next period t+1, while with probability 1 q the market-based
system (M) will be in place instead. Finally, 0   it  1 captures the cost of e¤ort to
inspire a change in the economic system, which in turn determines the probability of
each regime being in place in the subsequent period, qt+1 and 1   qt+1 for E and M
respectively.
2.3 Production and Income
We consider a one-sector real model where a single good is produced using a constant-
returns-to-scale linear technology. The output produced at time t in regime j is:
Hj;t = 'j [Kj;t + j;t(1  )L]; (2)
for j = M;E and depends on two productive factors, capital Kj;t depreciating fully
during t and labor L supplied inelastically by households. Workerswell-being is related
to their consumption, and incentives can be measured as labor-augmenting productivity
for a given amount of capital depicted by j;t(c) with properties 0j;t(c) > 0 and 
00
j;t(c) < 0
so that productivity gains are decreasing. Productivity is at its maximum level (M;t =
1) under a rich market-based economy, whereas it is undermined in centrally planned
economy due to the low consumption allocated by the government (E;t(c)  t < 1).
In other words, the level of consumption is the result of individual work e¤ort under
markets as workers are paid their marginal product and do not su¤er from the incentive
problems that occur under communism. Finally, the relative importance of capital and
labor in producing output are denoted by  and 1  , respectively.
Under competitive factor markets, returns to labor and capital can be written as
wM;t = 'M (1  )
and
rM;t = 'M:
9The inclusion of bequests in the utility function as a form of savings left as inheritance for the next
generation has a long tradition in economics: since Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) altruistic individuals
are believed to experience an increase in utility when they leave a bequest to their heirs.
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To capture densely in our model the essence of classicalcapitalism that led to the
spread of communist ideas in the late 19th century and following much of the literature,
we assume a satiation consumption level c, never crossed by the A type so that only
capital owners can invest. In the market system, income of capital owners and workers
in each period is respectively
yBM;t = rM;ts
B
t 1 = 'Ms
B
t 1; (3)
where sBt 1 is last-periods savings that are inherited from the parental generation, and
yAM;t = wM;t = 'M (1  ): (4)
Under communism, as capital is nationalized and capitalists are deprived of their
ownership, investment decisions are no longer individual but made by the egalitarian
planner. As a consequence, individual income becomes a centralized allocation of an
equal share of output to each member of the society as wages, which are not necessarily
equal to the marginal product of labor:
yBE;t = y
A
E;t = wE;t:
Note that in this case the whole population, including B types, forms the working class
(cAE;t = c
B
E;t = cE;t = wE;t).
Perceived income inequality arising from saving by capitalists in period t is the
relative income from capital versus that from labor:
t+1 
yBM;t+1
yAM;t+1
=

1  s
B
t ; (5)
where imposing the initial condition yBM;0 > y
A
M;0 prevents a capitalist from switching
types and becoming a worker.10
2.4 Savings and E¢ ciency
A capitalist, type B, chooses individual savings (which we denote by lowercase sBt ) to
maximize utility in (1) given the budget constraint
cBt + s
B
t  yBM;t: (6)
The timing of events during the accumulation process is as follows: the savings
of the previous period, sBt 1, comprise the private capital stock in the present period,
kM;t, which will then be put into production given (2). The private yields from capital
ownership yBM;t = rM;ts
B
t 1 generated through the production process are nally divided
between consumption cBt and savings s
B
t (forming the future capital stock, kM;t+1).
An egalitarian central planner instead maximizes utility (1) in the name of the type
A agents under the national budget constraint
Ct + St  HE;t: (7)
The savings decision by the planner di¤ers from private ones in that aggregate val-
ues are considered (which we denote by uppercase St). The same timing holds for the
accumulation process under the communist regime: St 1 comprises Kt, which is used
for national production along with labor and yields Yt = rE;tSt 1. Total output, HE;t,
10Note that inequality (t+1) would be increasing in savings under a more general production function
with imperfect substitutibility between capital and labor, regardless of capital accumulation increasing
the wages in a market-based economy. See Appendix A.1 for proof.
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is then allocated between further savings, St, and aggregate consumption in the soci-
ety, Ct, divided equally among all agents via identical wages assigned to all workers,
wE;t = cE;t. Note that under communism there is no market price of capital, therefore
rE;t is the shadow price of capital referred to in period t by the planner.
Perceived productive ine¢ ciency of the centralized system is expressed as distance
to the best-practicemarket frontier in terms of total returns from capital adjusted for
relative labor productivity in the two regimes:
t+1 
'M S^t
'ESt
1
t+1
; (8)
where St is savings by the egalitarian planner, and S^t a notional value of aggregate
savings under a free market system referred to by individuals. This is a theoretical
counterpart to Bergsons (1992) discussion of using the economys performance regarding
technical and allocative e¢ ciency, taken together, to compare productive e¢ ciency in
the two economic systems.11
2.5 Envy, Socialization and Regime Change
Type A agents promote a communist ideology to their next of kins upon envy against
higher relative social status of type Bs, while type B agents advocate a pro-market
ideology upon envy against a best-practice free market system.12 Socialization e¤ort by
type A is therefore generated by resentment against inequality, At  A(t), and for
type B by the inferior e¢ ciency with respect to markets Bt  B(t). A rst channel of
transmitting beliefs that captures the inuence within the family in the present context
is what is termed direct vertical transmission in the literature (Bisin and Verdier,
2001, 2010). The evolution over time of the relative political power to change the status
quo is, however, also a¤ected outside the family: this second channel, known as oblique
transmission, operates in the literature as well as in our model through the inuence
by peers and the broader environment (Saint-Paul, 2010).
The dynamics of the probability of a regime shift are endogenous to the current
economic situation and therefore depend on the disutility experienced by each type.
Endogenous socialization e¤orts 0   i ()  1 a¤ect the probability of regime change in
the next generation, where the property  it(1) = 0 we assume states that socialization
e¤ort is only activated upon su¤erance. This can also be thought of in terms of parents
acting as dissidents who engage in mobilization of the next generation against the regime
in power, as in Ginkel and Smith (1999). The properties of the socialization function
imply that A(t) = 0 under communism and B(t) = 0 under a market economy.
13
Accordingly, the law of motion is
qM;t+1 = qM;t + (qM;t   q2M;t)At  (9)
under markets and
qE;t+1 = qE;t   (qE;t   q2E;t)Bt  (10)
under communism. Thus, in the market system the relative political power of type A
to change the status quo, qM;t+1, increases with any positive socialization e¤ort by type
11The adjustment for relative labor productivity has been included in our denition as it captures a key
mechanism in the model whereby an increase in individual savings under markets does not interfere with
individual consumption allocations, while under communism the aggregate allocation of savings imposes
lower individual consumption to all workers and undermines labor productivity. This asymmetry in the
incentives to provide labor e¤ort that has not been perceived before the experiment with communism
and that has been discovered thereafter is demonstrated formally and interpreted against the historical
evidence in the later sections.
12Landier et al. (2008) nd empirically that ideological priors matter a lot in attitude formation.
13Derivations can be found in Appendix A.2.
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A, A(t) > 0. Analogously, in the communist system the relative political power of
type B to change the status quo increases, i.e., 1   qE;t+1 increases, with any positive
socialization e¤ort by type B, B(t) > 0.
For a successful revolution to occur, the political power of A-types in the society has
to be higher than a certain threshold q 2 (0; 1). Similar to Ticchi et al. (2013), this
threshold q is assumed stochastic and has a distribution  (q).14 Likewise, a transition
occurs if the political power of B-types in the society is higher than a certain threshold
(1   q) 2 (0; 1). This threshold q < q is also stochastic with a distribution (q).
Therefore,
F (qt+1)  Pr (qt+1  q) =
Z qt+1
0
 (q) dq (11)
represents the probability of the communist revolution being successful. Correspond-
ingly,
G (qt+1)  Pr
 
qt+1  q

=
Z 1
qt+1
(q)dq (12)
represents the probability of the transition to market taking place.
3 Economic Systems and Within-Generation Equilibria
We consider a sequencing of actions by type appropriate for both economic systems in
the framework of a von Stackelberg leadership game played within each generation in
any period t. The agent type who exercises ownership and control (economic power) to
decide on the split between consumption and savings moves rst. The other agent type
can only have socialization (or political) power by instilling beliefs against the regime in
force. The sequence of events at time t is illustrated in Figure 1 parallel to the process
of capital accumulation in the same period (see Section 2.4).
[Figure 1 about here]
3.1 Market-Based Economy
In the market system, capital owners control the allocation of their income between
consumption and savings, to be invested and used to produce in the next period by
the next generation. In contrast, workers do not own and control anything apart from
their labor force, which they supply inelastically in the model. It is therefore optimal
savings and capital accumulation within the capitalist dynasties, where ownership and
control rights are aligned and e¤ective, that drives the e¢ ciency and sustainability of
the market system but deepens the social inequality.
Type B agents in this case are the rst movers in the von Stackelberg leadership game
and decide on savings, while taking into consideration in their maximization problem
the socialization reaction of type A agents to the inequality caused by their own savings.
Starting with type A agents (the working class), they take savings as xed and maximize
their utility using (1):
max
At
UAM;t () = cAM;t   (1  qt+1) ln t+1  
(At )
2
2
:
14This is in line with the threshold model of Kuran (1989) that revolutions are unanticipated and
regimes can collapse suddenly with little warning. See also Yin (1998) for a discussion of the di¤erent
forms of distribution of such protest thresholds.
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Turning to type B agents, they move rst by making a decision on the amount of
their savings:
max
sBt
UBM;t () = cBM;t + ln yBM;t+1   qt+1 lnt+1  
(Bt )
2
2
s.t. cBM;t + s
B
M;t  yBM;t:
Note that savings by capitalists have no direct negative externality on aggregate produc-
tivity because the decision is made at an individual level and consumption by workers
cAM;t is not a¤ected by it.
Savings by type B as leaders and the socialization e¤ort of type A can be solved as
shown in Appendix A.3. Optimal saving is
sBt = 1  q2t (1  qt)2 ln
 
t+1

; (13)
where increased expected ine¢ ciency under the alternative (communist) system induces
lower accumulation by capital owners in an e¤ort to avoid a regime change. Observe
from (13) that, for any given expected ine¢ ciency t+1 (> 1), savings are at their
lowest level when the relative political power of the two types is not too di¤erent so that
q2t (1  qt)2 is near its maximum. Optimal socialization e¤ort is in turn
At
 = qt(1  qt) ln


1  s
B
t

: (14)
Substituting At
 from (14) into (9), next-period political power of type A to change
the status quo becomes
qt+1 = qt + q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln


1  s
B
t

: (15)
It is seen from (9) and (15) that the evolution of qt over time under a market system
is triggered when At
 > 0. This is true as long as
t+1(s
B
t ) 

1  s
B
t > 1; (16)
which holds as long as yBM;0 > y
A
M;0. Recall that socialization e¤ort aimed at a regime
change is only triggered upon su¤erance (for the A-type, for instance, At > 0 if t+1 >
1). Hence, there is no e¤ort to transmit preferences if labor income exceeds capital
income, i.e., when the income distribution is biased in favor of workers. This is equivalent
to assuming that At = 0 if t+1 =
yBM;t+1
yAM;t+1
 1, which is identical to the assumption made
in Mui (1995) in terms of propensity to envy.15
Lemma 1 Given the initial condition yBM;0 > y
A
M;0, optimal individual savings by capital
owners sBt always increase inequality, provoking type-A workers into more intensive
transmission of their social discontent and more e¤ort to instigate a regime change.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In sum, capital owners allocate their income between consumption and savings,
perpetuating inequality; workers then react by choosing their socialization e¤ort, which
in turn a¤ects the relative political power of the next generation to change the status
quo.
15Our mechanism can also be interpreted as workers e¤ectively disliking being poor because in the
utility function ln t+1 appears negatively, and if (16) does not hold, that is ln t+1 < 1, given the
functional form inequality would increase the utility of the workers. Alternatively, if ln t+1 appears
in absolute value jln t+1j, any form of inequality would decrease their utility. In this case, increased
savings caused by their socialization e¤ort would decrease inequality, accommodating their ideology and
avoiding a revolution.
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3.2 Centrally-Planned Economy
Under communism, the economic decisions are made by the egalitarian planner, who is
of type A and splits total consumption equally across all members of society.16 After
the nationalization following the communist revolution, the society, de jure (but not
de facto) owning the capital, delegates control to the egalitarian planner. Individuals
do not control the choice of aggregate consumption and investment out of national in-
come, which is also national output. Thus, under communism, there is misalignment of
ownership and control rights. We capture the ine¢ ciency that can arise from this mis-
alignment in comparing the optimization problems under central planning (aggregate,
then disaggregated top-down by equal split) vis-à-vis the market (individual, aggregated
bottom-up).
The egalitarian planner is the rst mover and takes into consideration the socializa-
tion reaction of type B agents to the relative ine¢ ciency of the system caused by his
centralized decision. Starting with type B agents (market advocates), they take savings
as xed and maximize utility according to (1):
max
Bt
UBE;t () = cBE;t   qt+1 lnt+1  
(Bt )
2
2
:
The egalitarian planner as a rst mover maximizes utility in the name of the type A
agents taking into account aggregate values.17 Therefore, the egalitarian planner (not
individual capitalists, whose capital has been nationalized) optimally chooses the level
of aggregate savings, i.e., national investment. This also determines the allocation of
output to be distributed equally among the total population for consumption:
max
St
UAE;t() = Ct + lnYt+1   (1  qt+1) ln t+1  
(At )
2
2
s.t. Ct + St  HE;t:
Parallel to the market economy, the planner takes Yt+1 as the value of the intergen-
erational transfer in his optimization problem using the shadow price of capital rE;t+1
(Yt+1 = rE;t+1St = 'ESt).
Given the national budget Ct+St = HE;t, aggregate decision making by an egalitar-
ian planner under a communist regime a¤ects total and per capita levels of consumption,
therefore changing productivity over time. Each individual gets an identical consump-
tion level equal to the assigned allocation by the planner
cE;t =
HE;t   St
1
= Ct: (17)
Since allocation between saving and consumption takes place after production in each
period, consumption in t determines productivity in the following period t+ 1. There is
an externality caused by productivity being a function of consumption, which is changing
over time in the new economic system.
16This follows our assumption of inequality aversion characterizing type A agents, to conform with
the preference for equality among the thinkers and pioneers of communism. Di¤erent from maximizing
social welfare, it presumes that the central planner himself experiences a disutility from inequality.
17Our choice of modeling assumption here reects the historical realities in the formerly socialist
countries. It is consistent, for example, with Kehayan and Kehayan (1978): The Party-State claims to
be the father of every citizen and claims the exclusive right to dispose of its individual happiness. [...]
The concept of democracy is reduced to a false semblance of discussion channeled by the Party. [...]
The silent majority lives in the waiting for a happy or unfortunate event but in any case on which it
will have no hold.(p. 216, our translation from French).
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Lemma 2 The budget constraint of an egalitarian planner in (7), Ct + St = HE;t,
implies that higher aggregate savings cut consumption by the whole population. This
results in a negative e¤ect on productivity t+1 and makes the latter time-dependent.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
If the negative externality is small enough so that savings in the egalitarian regime
would increase e¢ ciency, we are faced with a perfect communist economic system, which
brings equality and increases e¢ ciency. History has however proved otherwise and in-
stead revealed the existence of a trade-o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency brought by the
system. This can be observed from denition (8), where aggregate savings, St , increases
perceived ine¢ ciency of communism relative to markets, t+1, when its direct positive
e¤ect is dominated by its negative e¤ect via productivity in the next period, t+1. In
other words, when the egalitarian planner increases St to trigger an acceleration of the
accumulation process and a perceived fall in t+1, he must assign a lower consumption
level to all workers according to Lemma 2. Since productivity depends positively on
consumption in workersfamilies, next-period worker incentives and therefore produc-
tivity under communism, t+1, are reduced. If the latter e¤ect dominates, ine¢ ciency
increases and type B agents recruit intertemporally by intensifying their socialization
e¤ort.18
Lemma 3 Savings by the egalitarian planner increase ine¢ ciency if the direct positive
e¤ect on e¢ ciency is dominated by the indirect negative e¤ect via next-period labor pro-
ductivity (
@t+1
@St
+
@t+1
@t+1
@t+1
@St
> 0), leading type B agents to more intensive proliferation
of market ideas to instigate transition.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Lemma 3 is key to our analysis and suggests that the central planner faces a trade-o¤
between building capital through saving to ensure output growth and causing ine¢ ciency
in the subsequent period by reducing labor productivity. He must sacrice consumption
and next-period productivity to save and increase output, which may lead to more
discontent in the society and an increased probability of transition. Lemma 3 introduces
a mechanism that can describe the empirical ndings of Cheremukhin et al. (2017),
who show that while Soviet industrialization policies resulted in a signicant structural
change, they were disastrous in terms of productivity. In other words, despite the
attempts via investments in capital, the economy did not outperform the counterfactual.
Savings by the leader and the socialization e¤ort of type B can be solved as shown
in Appendix A.5. Optimal saving is
St = 1 + q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1) ; (18)
where increased expected inequality under the alternative (market) system induces
higher savings by the egalitarian planner in an e¤ort to further consolidate the capi-
tal stock and, hence, the productive potential of the communist system. Inversely to the
market system, observe from (18) that, for any given expected inequality t+1 (> 1),
savings are now at their highest when the relative political power of the two types is not
too di¤erent so that q2t (1  qt)2 is near its maximum. Note that there is an asymmetry
across regimes in that under markets savings are an individual investment based on self-
interest, and a reduction of it could be seen as a way of accommodating the demands of
the opposition. Under the egalitarian regime, savings are aggregate and for the common.
Increasing savings can therefore also be seen as a mode of accommodating the demands
18Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) discuss the disincentive e¤ects on work of welfare-state arrangements,
stressing in particular that the negative e¤ects of the poor incentives for work in former socialist
countries in Eastern Europe also seem to have materialized with a time lag.
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of the opposition, in an attempt to reduce ine¢ ciency (see (21)) but without perfect
information about (the extent of) its negative e¤ect on labor productivity.
Optimal socialization e¤ort is in turn
Bt
 = qt(1  qt) ln
 
'M S^t
'ES

t t+1
!
: (19)
Substituting Bt
 from (19) into (10), the next-period proportion of the population in
favor of a market-based system becomes
qt+1 = qt   q2t (1  qt)2 ln
 
'M S^t
'ES

t t+1
!
: (20)
It immediately appears from (10) and (20) that the political power of type As relative
to type Bs under the communist system weakens when Bt
 > 0. This is true as long as
t+1(S

t ) 
'M S^t
'ES

t t+1
> 1; (21)
which will turn out to be the initial condition at the moment of the communist revolu-
tion, T , due to destruction of some fraction of the capital stock (see section 4.3.1).
[Figure 2 about here]
Given Lemma 3, aggregate savings bring about ine¢ ciency when either St or
0(c)t+1
t+1
are su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, the concave nature of labor-augmenting pro-
ductivity as a function of consumption implies that the lagged negative e¤ect of savings
on labor productivity is large when aggregate consumption availability Ct is limited.
This can, for example, be due to a large loss of capital caused by the revolution and
corresponds to the left region in Figure 2, where cE;t < c.
With a highly elastic response of labor productivity to savings, the planners choice
of savings in the preceding period leads to a lower e¢ ciency, and to the instability of
communism derived in Lemma 3. We interpret the extent of this elasticity as the sac-
rice that the population of the communist region is willing to endure in the name of
an egalitarian system, i.e., to what extent their working morale is reduced by lower
consumption. This tolerance may have to do with cultural values, social norms, or
ideological conviction. It is, thus, ambiguous a priori, before experimentingwith com-
munism to learn its magnitude across di¤erent nations or cultures, as has been conrmed
from the various historical experiences with real-world socialism outlined in section 5.
In this consists, as we also discuss later, the aggregate ambiguity in our model facing a
society when abolishing the market system to establish communism and the subsequent
discovery of the trade-o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency at the scale of alternative eco-
nomic systems. Finally, the limitation of output growth in a centrally-planned economy
has been derived in Appendix A.6.
In sum, the egalitarian planner allocates national income between consumption and
savings at the aggregate level. Type B agents react by choosing their socialization e¤ort
to inuence the ideology of the next generation, thus determining their share in the next
period, 1  qt+1.
4 Intergenerational Dynamics and Economic Outcomes
In this section, we highlight our principal analytical ndings derived from the dynamics
of qt and the resulting economic outcomes. That is, having analyzed the within-period
game equilibrium strategies of our two agent types, we now examine the feedback from
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relative political power qt to strategies across generations. Given that agents only live
one period of adulthood, players in the von Stackelberg game change every period. In
other words, the same game is played by each next generation, with the level of relative
political power qt attained by socialization of agents in the previous period as the initial
condition. This allows us to observe the law of motion of qt and potential economic
transitions over time.
4.1 Capitalism and the Communist Revolution
We rst consider the dynamics underlying the transition from a market-based to a
centrally-planned economic system. We can state:
Proposition 1 (Communist Revolution) Suppose the majority type A is initially
stronger than type B (q0 > 0:5). Given At
, sBt , and the law of motion of qt, the
optimal savings increase in qt (
@sBt
@qt
> 0). This implies that a higher qM;t+1 caused by
At
 will result in more savings by type Bs in the next-generation von Stackelberg game
(
@sBt+1
@qt+1
> 0). As this trend continues, the probability of a communist revolution increases,
and a regime change eventually occurs if qt+1  q.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: starting from an initial condition q0 >
0:5, the mobilization of the working class caused by inequality increases the political
power of the next generation to overthrow the system. This induces more savings by
capital owners, but increases inequality, feeding the resentment of type A agents. The
reinforcing e¤ect of social resentment on capital accumulation and inequality could even-
tually lead the market system towards its fall. Historically, this is relevant to the case
of the uprising of the working class in Russia in October 1917, on which we motivate
the analysis. The intuition behind the fact that the regime in power responds contrary
to the preferences of the opposition when the threat is high, exacerbating the discon-
tent, is in line with Ginkel and Smith (1999) in that governments do not accommodate
concessions to avoid signalling weakness and that mobilization is more likely to succeed
under highly repressive conditions.
4.2 Communism and the Transition to Markets
We turn to the dynamics underlying the transition from a centrally-planned to a market-
based economic system in another proposition:
Proposition 2 (Market Transition) Observe from Proposition 1 that qT > 0:5 at
the moment of revolution and suppose Lemma 3 holds. Given Bt
, St and the law of
motion of qt, the optimal savings increase in 1   qt (@S

t
@qt
< 0). This implies that a
lower qE;t+1 caused by Bt
 will result in more savings by the egalitarian planner in the
next-generation von Stackelberg game (
@St+1
@qt+1
< 0). This trend continues, increasing the
threat of a transition back to a market-based economy, and a regime change eventually
occurs if qt+1  q.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Proposition 2 can be interpreted as follows: a communist system is only feasible
when type Bs are weaker than type As (1   qT < 0:5). Market propaganda that
arises from lower relative e¢ ciency under communism results in a shift of ideology in
the next generation towards the market-oriented type. This induces more savings by
the egalitarian planner as an attempt to restore e¢ ciency through more investment
and accumulation. Should Lemma 3 not hold, we would observe a perfect communist
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regime after the revolution that leads to reduced inequality, where the Big Pushholds,
and sweeping state investments should increase productivity in manufacturing. The
communist system would stabilize under these conditions and would gradually catch up
with the rest of the world (or surpass it). However, in line with the empirical evidence
in Cheremukhin et al. (2017) against the predictions of Big Push theories, Lemma
3 entails the presence of a negative externality of higher saving on productivity at the
aggregate level, as it is accompanied by lower available consumption and wages. Hence,
responding to more discontented people by further increasing savings only exacerbates
the relative ine¢ ciency of the communist regime, making it less and less sustainable.19
As the convergence of beliefs toward the market ideology continues, the probability
of economic transition increases, and the regime may eventually revert to the market
system. Historically, this is relevant to the Soviet and East European case in the late
1980s and early 1990s, on which we base the analysis.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 summarizes the dynamics of the model across generations. To elucidate
it, we briey revisit the events that lead to revolution and back to transition. Under
markets, initial (relative) inequality 0 > 1 and capitalist savings sBt > 0 in (16) leads
to ln (1) > 0 and A0
 > 0 from (14), which itself brings about an increase in the relative
political power of type As in the next period q1 through (15). According to equation
(13) and Proposition 1 this increases optimal savings by capitalists in the following
period, sB1 , raising inequality. This creates a continuing cycle towards a communist
revolution that can be summarized as:
sBt "! t+1 "! At "! qt+1 "! sBt+1 "! t+2 "! At+1 "! qt+2 " :::;
until a potential revolution occurs (Proposition 1). In the case of revolution, initial
(relative) ine¢ ciency T > 1 and central planners savings S

t > 0 satisfying condition
(21) gives ln
 
T+1

> 0 and BT
 > 0 from (19), which itself leads to a higher proportion
of B type agents in the following period qT+1 through (20). According to (18) and
Proposition 2, this increases optimal aggregate savings by the egalitarian planner in the
following period, ST+1, raising ine¢ ciency with respect to the market system as long as
Lemma 3 holds. This triggers a continuing cycle towards transition back to the market
system that can be summarized as:
St "! t+1 "! Bt "! qt+1 #! St+1 "! t+2 "! Bt+1 "! qt+2 # :::;
until a potential transition occurs (Proposition 2).
Corollary 1 (Stable Communism) Should market transition not occur for qt < 0:5,
a substantial threat from strong type Bs to overturn the regime induces the leader to
accommodate his strategy in search of a compromise by decreasing aggregate savings,
St , increasing longer-run e¢ ciency (via higher wages and consumption) and potentially
stabilizing the communist system.
19Essentially, such a set-up reects the overinvestment experience in communist countries during
their period of initial industrialization and subsequent attempts to increase future production (and, in
historical context, catch up with the West). In particular, the allocation of rare resources to defense
and military expenditure has been a distinctive feature of the USSRs leaders. Their behavior has been
analyzed by Gi¤ord and Kenney (1984), and famously documented by the CIA, whose work is reviewed
by Maddison (1998). As the latter states: The party elite gave highest priority to investment in heavy
industry and to military spending. Consumption shares were characteristically lower than in Western
countries.(p. 307). Comparative estimates of defense spending in the US and the USSR are provided
by Harrison (2003), and they conrm that defense spending in the USSR was (much) higher.
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Proof. See Appendix A.9.
The alternative in Corollary 1 arises because for relatively strong type Bs the prob-
ability of a regime change is perceived by the egalitarian planner as credible, thus the
latter adapts his behavior. An increase in the probability of a regime change (qt+1 < qt)
induces a reduction in aggregate savings by the egalitarian planner. This increases con-
sumption allocations and productivity, ultimately raising e¢ ciency of the communist
system for the range of parameter values where Lemma 3 holds. By maintaining e¢ -
ciency and reducing the relative political power of type Bs to change the status quo,
such a reaction by the egalitarian planner can prolong the communist regime and, po-
tentially, avoid surrendering central planning. This is a silentvariant of the market
transition case, and simply occurs once a majority of the adult population switches to
a market mentality as the communist leader holds on to power but gives in and acts
to increase e¢ ciency and accommodate market advocates when qt < 0:5. The conse-
quences coincide with a market transition as in this region either group in power tends
to accommodate the opposition, and represents a shift of policy of the communist regime
towards the preferences of the opposition favoring a market economy. Historically, this
resembles the Chinese social market economy, where pro-market economic reforms were
undertaken widely in coexistence with the centralized political system.
Recall that a transition to markets is most likely to occur when qt is near 0:5 where
optimal saving is at its highest. If a transition occurs when qt > 0:5, then the dynamics
of qt move towards a shift back to the previous regime. On the other hand, the regime
change is more likely to persist if it occurs for lower values of qt < 0:5.
Corollary 2 (Stable Capitalism) Should transition occur when qt < 0:5, it is more
likely that the market system persists since the leaders accommodate their strategy in
search of a compromise by decreasing savings, sBt , thereby mitigating inequality.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
The alternative in Corollary 2 arises because, for relatively strong type As perceived
as credible threat of a revolution, type Bs adapt their behavior. An increase in the
probability of a regime change (qt+1 > qt) induces a reduction in capital accumulation
by type Bs. By reducing income inequality and, hence, the relative political power
of type As to change the status quo, such a reaction by capital owners can avoid
slipping back towards communism.20 Historically, this seems to have been the case
of social democracies and the welfare state, where democratization of capitalism and
redistribution of income have preserved the market system. Moreover, if transition
occurs when qt becomes low, then the perceived post-transition inequality ln (t+1)
tends to be lower: many people are involved in the regime change as opposed to a
sudden transition led by a smaller group of people as in Russia, so capital would be
shared among a larger group. Therefore, there would not be much di¤erence between
communism and markets in terms of inequality: only ownership becomes private, but
the wealth is in the hands of many and individual savings, sBt , will be low.
[Figure 4 about here]
This convergence of the two polar economic systems can be thought of as either a
stable market economy sustained by a large entrepreneurial middle class (Corollary 2)
or a successful social market economy that applies to China (Corollary 1). The phase
diagram in Figure 4 summarizes the overall dynamics of regime switches under Lemma
3 in propositions 1 and 2, and stability obtained in corollaries 1 and 2, in the space
20Although we do not explicitly model redistribution, a part of the increase in capitalistsindividual
present consumption brought about by lower savings can be thought of as a transfer to the poor. This is
a concept similar to Galor and Moav (2006), in which capitalists nd it optimal to invest in the human
capital of the poor.
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of consumption and the balance of power between the two types in the society. The
shaded area illustrates the region of instability, where the pendulum restores force and
accelerates back to communism. Looking at Figure 4, note that B-agents start reducing
their savings (which reduces inequality) in response to an increase in the representation
of A-types (increasing threat to the market economy) when the level of this threat is
low, whereas the government in the communist regime increases savings (which increases
ine¢ ciency) in response to a rise in the representation of B-types (increasing threat to
the system) when the level of this threat is low. The reason for this asymmetry, as we
discussed earlier, is that similar to accommodating the demands of the opposition by
means of decreasing individual-based savings under markets, an increase in aggregate
savings for the benet of the next generation as a whole also aims to accommodate by
curtailing ine¢ ciency, unaware of its detrimental inuence on labor productivity. When
Lemma 3 holds, the indirect negative e¤ect dominates and savings increase ine¢ ciency.
This also highlights a feature of our results according to which when A-types are a
majority in terms of political power, the economic systems are unstable and switch back
and forth, whereas when B-types have more political power both systems move towards
stability. This is driven by the cultural transmission mechanism when Lemma 3 holds,
in which savings and envy reinforce each other in the former case and compensate each
other in the latter.
4.3 Regime Switches and Reallocation of Property Rights
4.3.1 The Moment of Communist Revolution
To better understand the dynamics of capital accumulation, it is helpful to have a closer
look at the rst period immediately following the communist revolution, T . Aggregating
all capital stock in the hands of the individual capitalists, a proportion 1 nT of the adult
population, that has been nationalized at the beginning of T and taking into account
the costs of the revolution in terms of a destroyed fraction of capital, 0 < 1   T < 1,
we write:
sBT 1 = kT
revolution)
cost (loss)
TkT = KT : (22)
The left-hand side of this expression is the optimal savings, sBT 1, invested into
capital stock, kT , by the individual capitalists just before the revolution and aggregated
at the national level; the right-hand side is the same capital stock after accounting
for the capital losses during the revolution and the nationalization of all the inherited
and surviving capital, TkT . The latter capital stock, KT , is what remains for the
egalitarian planner to put into production in period T and, obviously, KT < kT . Note
that productivity in T does not change, leaving the planner with unchanged productivity
that is equal to one, but a lower capital stock, KT . This results in reduced output in T
relative to T   1, inducing the planner to increase savings in his very rst intertemporal
allocation decision. Such a decision could, of course, be motivated by the need to rebuild
the capital base and compensate for the loss from the revolution, or to catch up with
the rest of the world, as we discuss in section 5.
From then on and under Lemma 3, in essence, period T + l, for l = 1; 2; :::, has a
lagged e¤ect on output in period T + l+1 via two channels: increasing the capital stock,
KT+l+1 = ST+l, through more savings in the preceding period, (i) increases output,
HT+l+1, but also (ii) decreases wages and consumption that are equally assigned to all
workers as from period T ; this reduces working morale and, hence, productivity in the
next period T+l+1 resulting in a lower output HT+l+1. To sum up, if Lemma 3 holds, an
elastic negative response of labor-augmenting productivity to savings across generations
is ensured and communism is not sustainable in the long run.
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4.3.2 The Post-Communist Transition Period
By symmetry, it is also important to have a closer look into the rst period immediately
following the transition of the post-communist society back to a market-based system.
We assume that market transition takes place through a process of privatization of
the capital stock in the beginning of period T + N . The capital stock that has been
accumulated by that time, KT+N , is then allocated to the new capital owners, who now
have to manage it, by a legal change into property rights.
As all agents are equal under communism, we assume that the share of the pro-
market population continues to increase upon continued socialization by opposition, so
that the share who are handed the nations capital stock at the moment of successful
transition, T + N , just after privatization is equal to 1   nT+N  1   qT+N . We thus
write:
ST+N 1 = KT+N
privatization) kBT+N : (23)
The left-hand side of this expression is the optimal savings, ST+N 1, invested into
capital stock, KT+N , by the egalitarian planner just prior to the transition to markets;
it is given directly at its aggregate national level (which also coincides in our model, with
a unit mass of adult population, with the per-capita mature-generation capital stock).
The right-hand side of (23) is the same capital stock after transition to markets and pri-
vatization, kBT+N , to be allocated to the new capital owners and put into production in
period T +N .21 Individual decision-making on the split between consumption and sav-
ings by the new capital owners eliminates the negative externality in the intertemporal
optimization problem typical for communism we highlighted. This allows higher output
and aligns invested savings with individually-consistent decisions of capital owners. It
also gradually restores the higher level of consumption characterizing the more e¢ cient
market system, yet reintroducing and perpetuating inequality.
5 Historical Evidence
Our model critically relies on the three following assumptions: (i) the use of aggregates in
the planners economic calculus, (ii) the lower labor-augmenting productivity delivered
by a centralized economy (under Lemma 3), and (iii) the willingness of the lagging
communist economy to catch-up with the market system. This section shows that these
assumptions merely reect commonly observed facts, grounding our model on historical
accounts.
Our rst assumption is that the calculus in a centrally-planned economy is not of
consent, to paraphrase Buchanan and Tullocks (1962) well-known book title, but of com-
mand: economic decisions are taken by higher authorities, which give orders (objectives)
to the lower-tier entities such as farms or plants (Ericson, 2008). A command or planned
economy does not consider individual (or individual-based) decisions, but nation-wide
aggregates. The debate about the virtues of market capitalism versus communist plan-
ning has received a lot of attention as early as the well documented discussion between
Lange (1936 [1956]) and von Hayek (1940, 1945). Lin (2009) shows how this Soviet-style
planning has endured, notably in the developing countries that have been inuenced by
the ideology or the country (the USSR) that largely sponsored it. Many studies conrm
that what we have referred to as a misalignment of ownership and control is prevalent
in such systems. Among others, Brixiová and Bulíµr (2003) or Bajona and Locay (2009)
show that basing decisions on economic aggregates is prone to deciencies and lower
21Similar to the moment of revolution, one can assume a certain cost of privatization in terms of the
lack of entrepreneurial and managerial skills of the new capital owners or because of inheriting ine¢ cient
or outdated enterprises and equipment, so that kBT+N = T+NKT+N .
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e¤orts by private individuals, which results in lower productivity performance. In the
words of Li and Yang (2005), probably nowhere else but in China did such economic
management result in a (human) disaster as large as the one during the Great Leap
Forward(19591964), which is an example of communist orthodoxy trying to harness
capital to catch-up with the West.
This logically guides the choice of our second main assumption: the lower produc-
tivity of the planned economy described in Lemma 3. Although it is very di¢ cult to
compare the two systems (if only because the Net Material Product, not the GDP, was
used in communist countries, excluding as a consequence the services), it has been shown
that the Soviet-type economies were less productive than their Western counterparts.
The USSR, for example, obtained a 2.1 per cent trend annual productivity growth per
head after WWII, which compares badly with the West, even after taking into account
the losses (and bounce back) due to the war (Harrison, 1998; Bergson, 1991). Broad-
berry and Klein (2012) conrm that the situation can be generalized to the Eastern
bloc countries, which they compare to the EEC6 and EEC9. Wu (2001) considers the
productivity of the Chinese industry, comparing it with the US, and nds that China
was strongly lagging behind. Even more strikingly, he shows that the average produc-
tivity in the 1990s (i.e., after the beginning of the reforms) was almost twice larger
than what had been reached since 1952. And the inferior productivity relative to mar-
ket economies is commonly attributed to the deciencies of a command economy (see,
for instance, Litwak, 1993), among which the weakening workersmorale, due to low
consumption possibilities (Bergson, 1991), as in our own modeling and interpretation.
The last main assumption of our analytical set-up is the willingness to catch-up
with the West, an objective which historically led to overinvestment and to a focus on
industry as a lever to reach that goal. USSR leaders repeatedly stated that their goal
was to bring as much comfort to their population as what existed in the West (Bergson,
1991). Harrison (1985) measures the degree of overinvestment and shows this feature
to be even more important in China than in the USSR, while Bergson (1991) draws the
link between the insistence on industry (and especially heavy industries) and the lower
consumption possibilities delivered by the Soviet economy. Easterly and Fischer (1995)
go as far as attributing the decline of the Soviet economy to such overinvestment bursts.
Indeed, Cheremukhin et al. (2017) use o¢ cial Soviet data to show how consumption
and productivity (TFP) fall under the Stalin period regardless of his e¤orts to cut
wedges/frictions in the society. The Soviet non-agricultural TFP actually declined by
about 20 per cent during its industrialization phase of 1928-40, whereas agricultural
productivity recovered after an initial decline in 1928-32 but remained below its Tsarist
trends.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical analysis above summarized the rise and fall of communism as a process
of experimenting with a new economic system that failed in most world regions, while
reaching stability  under some concessions  in few others. It also showed how the
same general mechanism we emphasized as driving social evolution could generate, under
certain conditions and under minor regime-dependent specicity, not just the advent of
communism but also its demise, or sometimes prolonged stability. That is, we proposed a
model of long-run economic dynamics as one possible explanation for a principal insight
from the history and the turn of events during the last century and a half. Our model
blends, in e¤ect, three lines of emerging recent literature briey outlined next, which we
could denote as (i) political economy à la Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2006);
(ii) cultural transmission à la Bisin and Verdier (2001, 2010); and new institutional
economics of long run change à la North (2005).
First of all, our work is in line with the few related formal accounts of political
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economy nature regarding the processes leading to successful democratization or to
dictatorships succeeding democracy and vice versa in unstable societies, in particular
the book by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Our approach is close to their framework
in that we employ all of their three fundamental building blocks, namely:
1. economic-based approach, emphasizing individual economic incentives as deter-
mining political attitudes and that people behave strategically in the sense of
game theory(p. xii);
2. the fundamental importance of conict, where di¤erent groups, sometimes social
classes, have opposing interests over political outcomes(p. xii);
3. political institutionsthat play a central role in solving problems of commitment
by a¤ecting the future distribution of de jure political power(p. xii).
It is interesting to note as well that their example of stable democracy, Britain,
corresponds to our stable capitalism under Corollary 2 and the hypothesis in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000a) that the extended franchise in the West prevented revolution.
Their case of repeated cycles of democratization and dictatorship, Argentina, relates
to our more general metaphor, in propositions 1 and 2, of the pendulum of economic
systems. Their example of a stable nondemocratic regime, Singapore, parallels our
Corollary 1, and its likely relevance to China.
Secondly, our paper also builds upon cultural transmissionà la Bisin and Verdier
(2001, 2010), and we employ the latter expression for comparability with the rest of
the literature even if the underlying mechanism in our case is not exactly the same.
That is, in our model it is not cultural transmission per se that drives the results, but
the combination of economic incentives and ideological beliefs with su¤erance from an
inferior relative status, i.e., envy (Taubman and Taubman, 1989; Mui, 1995). The paper
assumes that each follower agent type compares its economic well-being to othersbased
on its aversion against inequality or ine¢ ciency caused by the action of the leader. As
a result, type A followers su¤er from inequality under markets when type B is holding
power and saves, whereas type B followers su¤er from inferior e¢ ciency when type A
is holding power and saves. In our dynamic model, this mechanism is carried across
generations through the transmission of preferences. Although the propensity for envy
is zero in the case of higher relative status and positive otherwise, a fully rational model
à la Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) would lead to the same outcome if the type living
in its preferred system exerts lower e¤ort. In the opposite scenario not studied in the
model, the ruler could eventually block increasing political power of the opposition and
avoid a revolution or a transition.
Thirdly, our work focuses on and attempts to formalize Norths (2005) arguments
regarding the process of long-run economic change, where institutions are, according to
Aoki (2011), social artifacts that cognitively mediate agentsstrategic interactions and
their individual beliefs in societal games. North characterizes succinctly the nature of
this social evolutionary process as follows:
In contrast to Darwinian evolutionary theory, the key to human evolution-
ary change is the intentionality of the players. (...) Economic change, there-
fore, is for the most part a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions of the
actors about the consequences of their actions. The perceptions come from
the beliefs of the players  the theories they have about the consequences
of their actions beliefs that are typically blended with their preferences.
(North, 2005, p. viii)
Our goal with this paper was to capture the perceived reality ! beliefs ! institu-
tions ! policies ! altered perceived realitychain North (2005) emphasized in words
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into a coherent and general theoretical construct capable to highlight the social pendu-
lum across economic systems or their convergence using the specic case of communism.
Our model begins with a perceived reality that is unjust for our type A agents, as they
are born unequal and poorer. Their beliefs are thus shaped out by the ideal of achieving
equality, and are propagated by socialization and the spread of ideology across society.
At this initial point, however, the world has never operated a communist economic
system, to which the A types strive. In other words, the society faces huge (aggregate)
ambiguity if it decides to attempt a change in the status quo. In our model, Lemma 3
embodies the discovery of one of the dimensions of such an aggregate (or socio-economic)
ambiguity, namely corresponding to the highly elastic region that implies the negative
externality of savings on labor productivity under communism, unknown under markets.
The communist experiment accordingly creates its own institutions and policies, forcing
equality in incomes and a central planning system to replace the role of capitalists and
markets. But the social realities imposed by the revolution and nationalization turn
out simply not to work: all members of the communist region su¤er lower and lower
material well-being due to misaligned incentives resulting from a distorted ownership
and control structure. By abolishing private property and market signals communism
forces equality of ownership through a centralized allocation that comes at the cost of
lower productivity and poor coordination. While observing as a reference point the rest
of the world that has remained market-based and is performing better, a drive to pro-
market reforms the altered perceived reality reverts the society back to sustainability.
Although we conclude modeling the chain of social evolution at this point, the pendulum
certainly does not stop here and can either continue to swing back and forth or converge
and stabilize.
Sometimes if not often in history, the society faces the unavoidable challenge to
experiment with its own existence and future under huge ambiguity. With heterogenous
agents, information sets, expectations and interests, it is not always easy to agree on
a commonly shared plan, or at least hope for such a plan to possibly end up success-
fully. Doubts, conicts and ideologies emerge naturally, values and institutions evolve,
responding to evolving realities. At times, the experiment discovers a positive outcome.
And then society nds and settles into a new equilibrium, until the next unprecedented
vital change of the environment. However, when the outcome of such a social experi-
ment is negative, the pendulum of history swings back, or rather along a spiral, whose
circles constitute a gradation of hard-to-acquire learning.
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A Appendix (for online publication)
A.1 Inequality under a More General CES Production Function
In order to check the validity of our argument under a more general case, we have
assessed it using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, as
follows.
The output produced at time t in regime j is:
Hj;t = 'j
h
Kj;t + (1  ) (j;tL)
i 1

;
for j = M;E, where  is the degree of substitutability between the two inputs.
Under competitive factor markets, returns to labor and capital can then be written
as
wM;t = '
1
1 
M H
1 
M;t (1  )M;tL 1
and
rM;t = '
1
1 
M H
1 
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K
 1
M;t :
Next, we measure inequality as in the main text using the above values for the
marginal product of labor and capital. Doing so leads to
t+1
yBM;t+1
yAM;t+1
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recalling that the income of type-B agents under free market is equal to yBM;t+1 =
rM;t+1s
B
t . As a result, although increased capital accumulation will increase wages in
a market-based economy, income inequality (and thus the threat to the system) will
increase despite the reduced marginal returns to capital because of a larger accumulated
capital stock. Note also that M;t = 1 holds throughout the paper to account for the
fact that incentives are at their maximum level under a market economy.
A.2 Intergenerational Transmission Mechanism
The socialization process of the agents of each type, A and B, can be summarized as
follows: the transition probabilities at time t, P ijt , that a parent of type i has a child
with a stronger or weaker relative political power can be written as
PAAt = 
A
t
 +
 
1  At 

qt;
PABt =
 
1  At 

(1  qt) ;
PBBt = 
B
t
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Bt 

(1  qt) ;
PBAt =
 
1  Bt 

qt:
Given these transition probabilities, the relative political power of individuals of type
A in period t+ 1 is
qt+1 = qtP
AA
t + (1  qt)PBAt
= qt + (qt   q2t )
 
At
   Bt 

:
A.3 Solving the Market-Based Economy
Replacing for t+1 from (5) and for qM;t+1 from (9), the optimization problem becomes:
max
At
cAM;t  

1  qt + qt(1  qt)At 	 ln 1  sBt

  (
A
t )
2
2
:
The rst-order condition yields the optimal reaction of type A as follower:
@UAM;t ()
@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
  At = 0
, At  = qt(1  qt) ln
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s
B
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
: (A1)
This equation delivers a preliminary insight on the mechanisms that drive the evo-
lution from one system to another. An increase in private savings (by the capitalists)
leads to increased socialization e¤ort by type A agents. The latter can only expect a
growing inequality between the two types of agents, which reinforces their determination
to instill their values in the next generation, and to potentially change the regime. More
precisely, the higher the expected inequality generated by type B private savings, the
higher the e¤ort of type A to transmit their preferences towards a more equal society.
Turning to the problem of type B, after a series of substitutions and omitting the
M -subscript to savings due to the absence of individual savings under communism in
our model, we rewrite
max
sBt
'Ms
B
t 1   sBt + ln
 
'Ms
B
t
  qt + (qt   q2t )At  ln  t+1 :
26
Replacing for At
 with the optimal reaction of type A agents from (A1) and taking
the rst-order condition yields optimal savings by type B as leader,
@UBM;t ()
@sBt
=  1 + 1
sBt
  q
2
t (1  qt)2
sBt
ln
 
t+1

= 0
, sBt = 1  q2t (1  qt)2 ln
 
t+1

;
where the second-order condition to ensure a maximum is always satised.
A.4 Proof of Lemmas
A.4.1 Lemma 1
See equation (16) where @t+1
@sBt
> 0 increases At
 in (14) and qt+1 in (15).
A.4.2 Lemma 2
We can conclude from (17) and the properties of t+1 that
@t+1
@St
=  @t+1
@Ct
=  @t+1
@cE;t
  0(c)t+1 < 0:
A.4.3 Lemma 3
Ine¢ ciency in period t+1 increases if the direct positive e¤ect of saving in t on e¢ ciency
in t+ 1 is dominated by its negative lagged e¤ect on labor productivity via a reduction
in t+1:
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where we know @t+1@St < 0 from Lemma 2. This condition holds if and only if
0(c)t+1
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 :
A.5 Solving the Centrally-Planned Economy
Replacing for t+1 from (8) and for qE;t+1 from (10), the optimization problem becomes:
max
Bt
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
qt + qt(1  qt)( Bt )

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The rst-order condition then yields:
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@Bt
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Hence, an increase in the planners aggregate savings directly reduces the socializa-
tion e¤ort by type B agents. This is due to the fact that, as seen in (8), such an increase
is perceived to give a boost to the e¢ ciency of the communist system. While this e¤ect
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per se could reduce ine¢ ciency, it will be seen below that the command accumulation
process has a negative externality on labor productivity, leaving the total e¤ect of ag-
gregate savings on the relative e¢ ciency of the communist system and the socialization
e¤ort by type B agents ambiguous.22
Turning to the problem of the planner, after a series of substitutions, we obtain:
max
St
'E [St 1 + t(1  )L]  St + ln ('ESt) 

1  qt   (qt   q2t )Bt 	 ln (t+1) :
Replacing for Bt with the optimal reaction curve by type B agents derived in (A2)
and taking the rst-order condition yields:
@UAE;t ()
@St
=  1 + 1
St
+ q2t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1)

1
St
  
0(c)t+1
t+1

= 0
, St =
1 + q2t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1)
1 + ~t+1q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1)
; (A3)
where ~t+1 represents the perceived lagged semi-elasticity of labor productivity in t+ 1
with respect to consumption in t, i.e., 
0(c)t+1
t+1
. In the rest of the analysis, we assume
imperfect information, i.e., ~t+1 6= t+1 , with t+1 denoting the actual lagged semi-
elasticity of labor productivity in t + 1 with respect to consumption in t, about the
extent to which this value can be observed to analyze the di¤erent consequences of a
centralized regime.23
Solving out the inequality in Lemma 3 and replacing for optimal savings from (A3)
shows that in order for the lemma to hold the condition
t+1 >
1 + ~t+1q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1)
1 + q2t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1)
must be satised. This condition suggests that savings made at an aggregate level are
more likely to increase ine¢ ciency the larger is the actual lagged impact of saving on
labor productivity, t+1 , and the smaller is that predicted by the central planner, ~t+1 .
This would be in line with stylized facts provided in Brixiová and Bulíµr (2003) on how
(i) the planning authority did not know the true production function of individual rms
and their capacity utilization, and (ii) rms had vested interest to hide this information,
while the planner possessed only primitive monitoring technology. Knowing this and
without loss of generality, we set ~t+1 = 0 in the remainder of the analysis in order to
study the above-mentioned caveat of the communist system. Otherwise, a planner with
perfect information (~t+1 = t+1) will not undermine the sustainability of the economic
system, delaying or avoiding transition to markets.
With ~t+1 = 0, equation (A3) becomes
St = 1 + q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1) ;
where the second-order condition to ensure a maximum is always satised.
22This ambiguity resembles historical evidence such as that in Broadberry and Klein (2011), who show
Czechoslovakias comparative productivity position under the central planning regime with respect to
the UK to have initially improved before falling back to lower levels.
23The ambiguity the central planner faces lies hidden in the productivity function. While the negative
dependence of productivity on lagged consumption is known, the magnitude of this e¤ect is uncertain,
implying that agents do not have perfect foresight or complete information, although they are e¤ectively
rational in the context of the game they play.
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A.6 Output Growth in the Centrally-Planned Economy
Recalling St = Kt+1 and substituting St into the production function in (2), we get an
expression for next period output in terms of optimal savings:
HE;t+1(S

t ) = 'E



1 + q2t (1  qt)2 ln (t+1)

+ t+1(1  )L
	
:
The equation shows that the strong negative externality of savings on labor pro-
ductivity in the command economy under Lemma 3 also prevents production HE;t in
(2) from growing over time. This rules out the possibility of investment creating higher
consumption possibilities over time by raising total output.24
A.7 Proof of Proposition 1
We derive the e¤ect of the relative political power of workers in some period t on the
saving behavior of the capital owners in that period:
@sBt
@qt
= 2qt(1  qt)(2qt   1) ln
 
t+1
 < 0 if qt < 0:5
> 0 if qt > 0:5
:
Thus, for any high qt > 0:5, we have
@sBt
@qt
> 0. In words, the optimal reaction functions
of the two types in the von Stackelberg game under markets lead to a progressive increase
of qt. Type As become increasingly strong to overthrow the existing capitalist social
order. In each period t a communist revolution may occur with probability qt.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
We derive the e¤ect of the relative political power of market advocates in some period
t on the saving behavior of the egalitarian planner in that period:
@St
@qt
=  2qt(1  qt)(2qt   1) ln (t+1)

> 0 if qt < 0:5
< 0 if qt > 0:5
:
Thus, for any high qt > 0:5 (i.e., any low 1   qt < 0:5), @S

t
@qt
< 0 (i.e., @S

t
@(1 qt) > 0).
In words, the optimal reaction functions of the two types in the von Stackelberg game
under communism lead to a progressive decrease of qt. In each period t a pro-market
transition may occur with probability 1  qt.
A.9 Proof of Corollaries
A.9.1 Corollary 1
When qt < 0:5, type Bs become su¢ ciently strong to represent a credible threat to
bring down communism. Consequently, the optimal aggregate savings, St , becomes
increasing in qt (that is, decreasing in 1  qt). See the proof of Proposition 2.
A.9.2 Corollary 2
When qt < 0:5, type B leaders decrease savings, sBt , as a response to a higher qt,
potentially stabilizing the market system. See the proof of Proposition 1.
24For an insight on the reduced consumption opportunities delivered by communist regimes, see for
example Bergson (1991).
29
Figure 1: Sequence of Events in Period t
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Figure 2: The Impact of Centralized Savings on Ine¢ ciency
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Figure 3: Dynamics of Relative Political Power across Generations
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Regime Switches and Stability
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